Usually, a manager's wage does not vary with the effort he expends in
serving the ultimate interest of the owners: maximizing the value of their
investment. Therefore the manager has no incentive to expend his best
efforts in attaining this goal. Neither an increase nor a decrease in the firm's
stock price as the result of its business performance will affect the payment
to the manager. This problem is often referred to as "moral hazard."
A more serious problem is the conflict of interest between the principal
and his agent. The manager of a firm may pursue his own goals. He may
indulge in perks at the expense of the company, such as constructing
luxurious facilities or undertaking other excessive spending sprees. He may
look for sale bonuses rather than optimum sale prices of the company. He
may seek to take on large projects in order to expand his power, even when
the projects are not profitable or too risky. These goals may not help
increase, and may even decrease, the market value of the owners' equity.
The most obvious mechanism for limiting these agency problems is for
the principal to engage in direct monitoring of the agents to ensure that the
agents act in the principal's interest. However, monitoring is costly and can
be unfeasible. In the next article, we will consider an indirect mechanism
that uses stock options to align the interests of principals and agents.
25. VẤN ĐỀ GIỮA NGƯỜI ỦY NHIỆM VÀ NGƯỜI THỪA
HÀNH
Trong một cơ cấu doanh nghiệp thông thường, chủ sở hữu (người ủy
nhiệm) thuê các nhà quản lý (người thừa hành) và trao cho họ một số quyền
để điều hành doanh nghiệp. Do chủ sở hữu không trực tiếp điều hành công
ty nên họ có ít thông tin hơn các nhà quản lý. Kết quả là người thừa hành
có thể có các hành động không phục vụ cho lợi ích của chủ sở hữu. Điều
này có thể xảy ra theo nhiều cách.
